Coalitional Provision of Pure Collective Goods

public goods;overprovision;underprovision;lobbying;implementation

Relational constraints in coalition formation

Equilibrium Theory;econometrics

The Role of Trust in Costly Network Formation

We consider game theoretic models of social network formation.In this paper we limit our investigation to game theoretic models of network formation that are based on individual actions only.Our approach is based on three simple and realistic principles: (1) Link formation is a binary process of consent.(2) Link formation is costly.(3) The class of network payo functions should be as general as possible.We provide characterizations of stable networks under the hypothesis of mutual consent in the cases of two-sided and one-sided link formation costs. Furthermore, we introduce a new equilibrium concept based on a limited, realistic form of farsightedness or "trust" in network formation.game theory;models;general equilibrium;stability

Stable Networks and Convex Payoffs

Recently a variety of link-based stability concepts have emerged in the literature on game theoretic models of social network formation.We investigate two basic formation properties that establish equivalence between some well known types of stable networks and their natural extensions.These properties can be identified as convexity conditions on the network payoff structures.social networks;network formation;pairwise stability

Spatial Social Networks

social networks;implementation;spatial cost topologies

Characterization of economic agents in arbitrary communication structures

Equilibrium Theory;Markets;economic theory

Social Network Formation with Consent

We investigate the equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation that are based on individual actions only.Our approach is grounded in three simple and realistic principles: (1) Link formation should be a binary process of consent.(2) Link formation should be costly.(3) The class of network payoff functions should be as general as possible.It is accepted that these consent models have a very large number of equilibria.However, until now no characterization of these equilibria has been established in the literature.We aim to fill this void and provide characterizations of stable networks or the cases of two-sided and one-sided link formation costs.Furthermore, we provide a comparison of Nash equilibria with potential maximizers for a certain specification.game theory;general equilibrium

The interdependence between production and allocation

Production;Allocation

Club Efficiency and Lindahl Equilibrium with Semi-Public Goods

Limit core allocations are the ones that remain in the core of a replicated economy. An equivalent notion for economies with public goods is Schweizer's club efficiency. We extend this notion to economies with goods that have a semi-public nature. The notion encompasses purely private as well as purely public club goods as polar cases. We show that given certain conditions the equivalence of club efficient allocations and Lindahl equilibria holds for a wide range of economies with semi-public club goods. We also show that extension to a more general class of economies seems implausible.clubs;club efficiency;Lindahl equilibrium;limit cores